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The Normative Molecule:  
Patent Rights and DNA 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat 
Abstract: Throughout the biotechnology age, fears about the distortionary ef-
fects of property and other legal institutions upon the health and self-
determination of individuals and societies have accompanied more popularly 
sensational fears about unscrupulous choices within the scientific community 
itself. Still, for most of that time the prevailing legal regime both in the United 
States and in Europe remained generally permissive of ownership of, and ex-
clusionary power over, the fruits of much biomedical research, though this le-
niency took different forms and came about in different ways. In particular, 
the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to grant patents 
on genetic compositions such as DNA sequences produced an extensive land-
scape of legal rights that would eventually provoke a backlash in both legal and 
popular opinion during the Myriad Genetics lawsuit. This case study examines 
the normative dimension of patent rights over isolated DNA sequences 
through the lens of the Myriad case, discussing the institutional context in 
which the case arose and identifying ethical lessons that the case offers. 
Keywords: DNA, genetics, patents, Myriad, innovation, ethics. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The magic microscope 
In April 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice did something it had never 
done before, and it was a sign of things to come. The Solicitor General, the 
Justice Department lawyer who represents the U.S. government in lawsuits, 
came personally to argue the government’s position in a patent case before 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (‘Federal Circuit’, in the following). 
Ordinarily, the Solicitor General would have left a case like this to be argued 
by the solicitor of the specific agency that deals regularly with the subject 
matter of the lawsuit, especially in a complex field like patent law. Indeed, the 
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Solicitor of the Patent Office regularly does this in Federal Circuit cases. At 
most, the Solicitor General might have sent a lawyer from his Justice De-
partment staff if the case was more important than usual. Even then, agency 
lawyers from the Patent Office (who know the subject matter) and Justice 
Department lawyers (who coordinate legal policy across the executive 
branch) would have met and planned out the strategy together. What made 
this case special, and what did the Solicitor General’s appearance portend? 
 The answer came from a confluence of three unusual problems, and all of 
them were related to the underlying science of DNA and to the question of 
expertise in genetic and genomic science. The lawsuit was about whether 
certain patents held by Myriad Genetics were valid. Myriad was founded in 
the 1990s by scientists at the University of Utah who, like others at the time, 
were trying to isolate the gene or genes associated with elevated risks of de-
veloping breast and ovarian cancer. The Myriad-Utah team, which also in-
cluded researchers from the National Institutes of Health and elsewhere, 
were the first to isolate and publish the sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes. The team then sought patents variously related to these gene sequenc-
es, and the Patent Office granted the patents. The Public Patent Foundation 
(PUBPAT) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), concerned 
about the effects of these kinds of patents, brought a lawsuit in 2009 to inval-
idate Myriad’s patents. The lawsuit was assigned to Judge Robert Sweet of 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. This was the 
case now pending on appeal in the Federal Circuit, following Judge Sweet’s 
decision in the district court. 
 One problem was that the Patent Office continued to disagree with the 
Justice Department on a fundamental matter of patent law and policy. That 
was whether isolated DNA sequences themselves fall within the broad scope 
of patent-eligible subject matter – i.e., whether isolated DNA sequences even 
belong in the patent system.1 The disagreement mattered. The Patent Office 
sits in the Department of Commerce and is an executive-branch agency. 
Ordinarily, the Patent Office has the power to grant or deny patent applica-
tions, and it has more expertise about science and technology than most oth-
er parts of the executive branch; certainly it has more expertise on patent law 
than any other agency. Meanwhile, the Solicitor General’s office at the Justice 
Department sets legal policy across the executive branch. So when the Patent 
Office has one view about proper patent policy, the Solicitor General’s office 
has a different view, and both sides have debated an impasse: who should 
prevail? 
 Who does prevail is simple: the Solicitor General. But is that a good and 
sensible rule? Perhaps the expertise of the Patent Office means that its view 
should be the official view of the U.S. government on all patent matters. Or 
perhaps the greater experience that the Solicitor General has coordinating 
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across multiple specialized disciplines (like patent law, tax law, environmental 
protection, securities regulation, etc.) means that its view should be the offi-
cial view of the government. The superior policy authority of the Solicitor 
General’s office means that although it should, and does, listen to expert 
agencies and learn from them, it does not defer to them. The Solicitor Gen-
eral still makes an independent decision and, importantly, expects the agen-
cies in the executive branch, like the Patent Office, to accept that decision 
and sign on to it. 
 That last expectation did not come to pass this time. The Solicitor of the 
Patent Office did not sign the government’s brief, indicating continued and 
unreconciled disagreement with the Solicitor General about what the official 
position of the government ought to be, and indicating that disagreement 
publicly. It is not clear whether this played any role in the Solicitor General’s 
decision to appear in the case. However, his unprecedented appearance while 
this intra-governmental disagreement was still a live issue highlighted the 
Patent Office’s contrary position and made it an important sticking point. 
Oral arguments both at the Federal Circuit and later at the Supreme Court 
brought up this fundamental dispute between the expert opinion of the spe-
cialist agency and the official opinion of the generalist authority. 
 A second problem that complicated matters further was that the Patent 
Office was not the only executive-branch institution that had relevant scien-
tific expertise, and even the experts disagreed. The position of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) diverged from that of the Patent Office. The 
NIH is an agency within the Department of the Health and Human Services 
and supports scientific research through extensive federally funded research 
grant programs, especially research in the life sciences. Thus, like the Patent 
Office, the NIH had significant claims to expertise at least in the underlying 
subject matter of Myriad’s patents, even if it could not necessarily claim the 
same level of expertise as the Patent Office about patent policy. For this very 
reason, inter-agency discussions to consider policy questions are structured 
to consider all relevant positions across the executive branch before the gov-
ernment’s official position is decided. And this, too, underscored the im-
portance of the Solicitor General himself entering an appearance to argue in 
the Federal Circuit. 
 A third and more elusive problem was that the Federal Circuit itself was 
potentially at odds with the Supreme Court, either about the disputed patent 
policy matter in general, about the Myriad case in particular, or both. Federal 
judges are legal generalists, and the way they are selected – political nomina-
tion by the President and confirmation by the Senate – does nothing in par-
ticular to promote expertise in science and technology. The Federal Circuit is 
different. Created in 1982, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals hears ap-
peals from all patent lawsuits in the entire country. Other circuit courts in 
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the federal system hear appeals only from their respective geographic regions. 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction was defined by subject matter rather than 
geography in order to promote uniformity and expertise on matters of patent 
law. 
 As a result, the Federal Circuit has extensive experience with patent law 
and receives hundreds of patent cases each year. Federal Circuit judges are 
steeped in patent doctrine, and of those who come to the bench, many have 
formal education in physical science or engineering disciplines. By contrast, 
the Supreme Court receives thousands of requests but chooses to hear fewer 
than a hundred cases each year, and of these, it is unusual that even one or 
two cases a year are about patent law. As for Supreme Court Justices them-
selves, if there is a field in which they develop expertise before coming to the 
bench, it is usually constitutional law or administrative law, certainly not 
patent law. 
 So just as the Patent Office came to the dispute with greater expertise but 
less authority than the Solicitor General, the Federal Circuit came to the case 
with greater technical and doctrinal expertise but less judicial authority than 
the Supreme Court. And unlike the executive branch, the two courts could 
not directly confer and debate the case. The Federal Circuit would have to 
decide the appeal for itself first, then wait to see whether the Supreme Court 
would take the case and, if so, how the Court would rule. So the direct in-
volvement of the Solicitor General right at the Federal Circuit highlighted 
the case even more starkly for the Supreme Court’s consideration. 
 So far, this may seem like a story about competing claims for power and 
claims of expertise, but not especially a story about genetic science itself. The 
clearest evidence against this came in the first minute of the argument of 
Neal Katyal, the Acting Solicitor General. The Myriad patents in question 
contained various DNA-related claims, but what eventually drove the lawsuit 
was a distinction between isolated fragments of genomic DNA (gDNA) and 
isolated fragments of complementary DNA (cDNA). The structure of these 
DNA fragments, especially their nucleotide sequences, were, at some basic 
level, the result of nature’s handiwork. For this reason, the PUBPAT and 
ACLU challengers believed that both of these types of isolated DNA se-
quences, genomic as well as complementary, were not patent-eligible at all.2 
 The government took a more modest position. gDNA was not patent-
eligible, agreed Katyal, because its nucleotide sequence does occur in nature – 
in that portion of the chromosome itself where the relevant gene is located – 
but cDNA was eligible because its nucleotide sequence does not occur natu-
rally. When cDNA is synthesized from mature messenger RNA (mRNA), 
the introns have already been removed from the RNA transcript, leaving only 
exons. Thus, the removal of introns changes the nucleotide sequence from 
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what occurs in nature to something different, akin to a magazine from which 
all the advertisement pages have been torn out. 
 To illuminate this distinction, Katyal invited the court to imagine a ‘magic 
microscope’ that could zoom in on nucleotide sequences. Using such a mi-
croscope, the sequence of an isolated gDNA fragment could be compared to 
the sequence of wild-type gDNA from the same gene in vivo. The compari-
son would reveal that the sequences were the same. Meanwhile, a comparison 
between an isolated cDNA fragment and any corresponding wild-type DNA 
or RNA would reveal that the sequences were not the same (because the 
introns had been removed). 
 This metaphor of the magic microscope was rhetorically powerful. It met 
the scientific expertise of both sides in the dispute with the government’s 
own scientific expertise, but reflected shrewd choices about which scientific 
details should matter. The magic microscope argument pointed the court 
toward the sequence information contained in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes, and the normative implications of that information, rather than solely 
the chemical structure of the DNA that constituted the genes. It urged scien-
tific and lay audiences: don’t miss the forest for the trees. DNA is a chemical 
compound, yes, but that is not all it is. 
1.2 Patent rights and the special case of DNA 
Before going further, it is helpful to clarify the terms a bit. How does the 
intellectual property framework of patents work, and does DNA pose special 
problems for patent law? Intellectual property can be understood most simp-
ly by analogy to more familiar kinds of property. For example, a company 
that owns a car and a traveler who rents the car both hold property interests 
in the same underlying thing: the car. Where the underlying thing is some 
new and useful invention, the property interests people can hold over that 
invention are called patent rights, and they are one form of IP. (Other forms 
include copyrights and trademarks.) 
 What do these property interests entail? The interest of the company that 
owns the car includes various rights, like the right to remove unauthorized 
drivers from the car, the right to paint the car red, the right to sell the car, 
and so on. The interest of the traveler renting the car also includes rights, but 
understandably, these are fewer than – and, in some sense, inferior to – the 
owner’s rights, as the rental agreement spells out. 
 Patent rights start out similarly. An inventor who holds a patent on her 
invention – say, a special wooden chair – can for a limited period of time 
exclude others from making the chair, using it, selling or offering to sell it, or 
importing it into the country. (After that time, the chair enters the public 
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domain, and anyone can use it freely.) But what does it mean to think of the 
chair as an invention rather than just another tangible thing? 
 It means that if someone buys lumber, saws the lumber into parts, and 
assembles those parts into something that matches the patented chair, then 
he is infringing the inventor’s patent right. The patent covers not just one 
specific physical chair, but all objects that shares the particular features of the 
chair. The infringer used his own materials, tools, and effort. Indeed, he has 
his own property interests in those things. Yet his rights do not extend to 
making the patented chair as he has done. This makes patents an extraordi-
nary kind of property right, which are granted only as a reward for inventing 
something new and useful, something society would not have received (or 
would not have received as soon) without the inventor’s contribution. Even 
with the patent’s restrictions, society is still better off than if the new chair 
had never been invented. 
 Still, one can easily imagine how this setup can get messy where the in-
vention has important social and dignitary implications, such as with DNA. 
It is one thing to grant patents as a reward for inventing a new organic sol-
vent for degreasing engines. Is it the same to grant patents for discovering a 
gene sequence, or designing a new one? They are both chemical compounds, 
but subjecting them to private property rights can have dramatically different 
effects. 
 For several decades, the Patent Office saw no problem and granted gene-
related patents routinely. The idea was that taking away the patent reward for 
DNA-related inventions would slow down investment in those inventions, 
harming society in the long run. This explanation assumed a lot about the 
nature and drivers of invention. Those assumptions are what had allowed 
Myriad to obtain their patents and what PUBPAT and the ACLU had to 
attack, at least as to DNA patents. 
2. Ownership of DNA Through Patents 
2.1 The Myriad genetics patents 
Although PUBPAT and the ACLU were challenging fifteen claims across 
seven different Myriad patents, three claims are particularly relevant for the 
present purposes.3 These are three of the composition claims from U.S. Pa-
tent No. 5,747,282 entitled ‘17Q-linked breast and ovarian cancer susceptibil-
ity gene’. The Federal Circuit and, later, the Supreme Court evaluated these 
three claims as being representative of all the composition claims in dispute. 
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 By law, the claims in a patent can cover subject matter from any of four 
categories: compositions of matter, processes (which in patent law are syn-
onymous with methods), machines, and manufactures (35 U.S.C. § 101). 
Here, the composition claims asserted ownership over identified isolated 
DNA sequence molecules themselves. The legal logic was that although a 
given DNA sequence may be quite large chemically, it is still ultimately a 
molecule and thus a composition of matter. The method claims, meanwhile, 
asserted ownership over ways of doing things related to the identified DNA 
sequences, such as making comparisons between the claimed DNA sequences 
and other DNA sequences or screening potential cancer therapies. These 
method claims were separately found invalid. 
 Considering the actual language of the composition claims that the Fed-
eral Circuit took as representative, the following are claims 1, 2, and 5 of 
Patent No. 5,747,282: 
1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having 
the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2. 
2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide se-
quence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. 
5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1. 
The terms ‘SEQ ID NO:1’ and ‘SEQ ID NO:2’ refer to sequences that are 
fully spelled out later in the patent. For example, ‘SEQ ID NO:2’ refers to a 
particular amino acid sequence corresponding to a BRCA1 polypeptide; the 
sequence is Met-Asp-Leu-Ser-Ala-Leu-… and so on. Thus, claim 1 covers 
any nucleotide sequence that codes for the polypeptide having that amino 
acid sequence. As biochemists know, the genetic code is redundant such that 
the same amino acid can be coded by multiple nucleotide triplets. For exam-
ple, the codons CGT, CGC, CGA, CGG, AGA, and AGG all code for argi-
nine. The syntax of claim 1 – defining the DNA sequence by reference to the 
polypeptide sequence – ensures that all relevant redundancies are covered. 
Claim 2 then goes further by specifying one example of a nucleotide se-
quence, the one set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1, that codes for the amino acid 
sequence of SEQ ID NO:2. Claim 5 broadens the scope of the patent right 
even further by claiming all sub-sequences of claim 1 that are 15 nucleotides 
or longer. 
 To understand the scope of how broadly these claims sweep, consider just 
the first six amino acids that are listed above from SEQ ID NO:2, Met-Asp-
Leu-Ser-Ala-Leu. The different nucleotide triplets that code for each amino 
acid are as follow: 
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Amino Acid Codons Codons that Code for that Amino Acid 
Met (Methionine) 1 ATG      
Asp (Aspartic acid) 2 GAC GAT     
Leu (Leucine) 6 CTA CTC CTG CTT TTA TTG 
Ser (Serine) 6 AGC AGT TCA TCC TCG TCT 
Ala (Alanine) 4 GCA GCC GCG GCT   
Leu (Leucine) 6 CTA CTC CTG CTT TTA TTG 
 
From these redundancies, this six-peptide fragment alone could be coded by 
1,728 different DNA sequences (1×2×6×6×4×6), each merely 18 nucleo-
tides in length. For example, the following is but one of the 18-nucleotide 
sequences that would code for the Met-Asp-Leu-Ser-Ala-Leu polypeptide 
sequence. Moreover, each 18-nucleotide sequence would have 10 sub-
sequences that were at least 15 nucleotides long. 
 
Met Asp Leu Ser Ala Leu 












This means that Claim 5 multiplies the 1,728 different DNA sequences to 
17,280 different DNA sequences over which the claims assert ownership. As 
the length of the claimed polypeptide grows, the permutations of codons, the 
number of sub-sequences that are at least 15 nucleotides in length, and the 
overall number of isolated DNA sequences that are covered by the patent 
grows exponentially. The upshot of this broad patent scope is that composi-
tion claims directly covering isolated DNA sequences on the scale of a gene 
like BRCA1 or BRCA 2 are powerful legal instruments, and reflect the high 
stakes of the Myriad case. 
 In practical terms, the broad exclusionary power of patent rights over 
DNA as a composition means that even some new use for the patented DNA 
sequence or some new method involving the patented DNA sequence – a use 
or method that was unknown at the time of patenting – would still be en-
cumbered by the patent rights that Myriad held. It would be as if someone 
walked around a piece of uncharted land, mapped it, and acquired a property 
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right over it. Minerals in the land or oil below it would belong to the proper-
ty holder, just as much as the land itself does, even if the owner had no 
knowledge of those additional resources. Indeed, this is a simplified example 
of how property rights in land actually work, though it is highly contested 
whether it is appropriate for the law to treat genetic resources in the same 
way. 
2.2 The ‘product of nature’ doctrine in patent law 
The Myriad case itself had already reached a significant milestone by the time 
it arrived at the Federal Circuit. The federal district court in Manhattan, 
where the case began, had given the challengers of the Myriad patents a clear 
victory. They had standing to file the lawsuit in the first place (a technical 
issue of court procedure but very important in public interest lawsuits like 
this). And according to the district court, all of the composition claims (as 
well as all of the method claims) of the patents in question were patent-
ineligible. Myriad had come to the Federal Circuit to seek reversal of these 
judgments. Meanwhile, the direct and personal involvement of the Solicitor 
General, discussed above, meant that continued interest in the case – includ-
ing review by the Supreme Court – was likely. The composition claims, 
whose scope swept so broadly, were the especially contentious element of the 
case. The Federal Circuit would have to both decide and explain which ap-
proach to take in evaluating the patent-eligibility of claims that covered iso-
lated sequences of genomic DNA (gDNA), complementary DNA (cDNA), 
or both. 
 To do so, the Federal Circuit would have to apply the ‘product of nature’ 
doctrine. A longstanding rule of patent eligibility, the doctrine provides that 
natural products themselves are not allowed to be patented, though other 
things that build on products of nature may be eligible. How a decision mak-
er might apply this rule depends to some extent on what the justifications for 
the rule are understood to be. One justification is that patent rights are an 
incentive and reward for those who invented the subject matter of the patent, 
but products of nature are not invented at all; they arise from natural pro-
cesses without human design or intervention. Another is that patent rights 
exist to promote innovation, and because natural products are among the raw 
materials from which innovation is conducted, they should remain unencum-
bered for public use. 
 The first explanation is more analytical and emphasizes conditions and 
criteria for deciding whether something is a product or nature and therefore 
ineligible for patenting or is not a product of nature and so may, indeed, be 
eligible. The second explanation is more instrumental and emphasizes the 
desirability of the outcomes that are likely to come about based on whether 
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something is deemed an ineligible product of nature or not. In practice, these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. Courts rely in various ways and to 
varying degrees on both explanations as they apply the doctrine in accord-
ance with traditional methods of legal analysis. 
 An important element of that analysis is respecting prior precedents. To 
grasp the product of nature doctrine, two precedents are especially helpful. 
One is the Supreme Court’s decision in Funk Brothers v. Kalo Inoculant 
(Funk Brothers 1948). In the Funk Brothers case, the patent was directed 
toward a mixture of nitrogen-fixing bacteria from the genus Rhizobium that 
can infect and form nodules on the roots of leguminous plants. Before the 
patent, growing leguminous plants with the necessary capacity for nitrogen-
fixation required using individual strains of Rhizobium for different kinds of 
plants. The different bacterial strains could not be mixed because they were 
believed to inhibit each other. The inventor discovered a combination of 
these bacteria that did not have this mutually inhibitive effect and allowed 
mixed strains and obtained a composition patent on the mixture of bacterial 
strains. The Supreme Court held, however, that the mixture was a product of 
nature, and thus ineligible, because each strain remained unchanged by the 
mixing and continued to perform its natural function. 
 The other helpful precedent is the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty 1980). In that case, microbiologist Anand 
Chakrabarty had invented a transgenic bacterium from the genus Pseudomo-
nas containing plasmids that coded for the ability to degrade hydrocarbons. 
The genetically engineered bacterium could break down elements of crude oil 
and was believed to be valuable in cleaning oil spills. Dr. Chakrabarty had 
sought method and composition claims, including a composition claim to the 
bacterium itself. The Supreme Court held that the bacterium was not a prod-
uct of nature and was patent-eligible. The decision provided important doc-
trinal lessons. First, patent eligibility is broad, embracing ‘anything under the 
sun that is made by man’.4 Second, though products of nature are ineligible, 
an invention may distinguish itself from a natural product if it has ‘markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature’. 
 In its explanation, the Supreme Court drew a direct comparison to its 
decision in Funk Brothers. Whereas the root nodule bacteria were unchanged 
and did the same thing in combination that they did individually, Dr. 
Chakrabarty’s engineered bacterium was a new organism that did not occur 
in nature. It is important to note that this conclusion is a matter of perspec-
tive. The Pseudomonas host bacterium did do what it had always done, ordi-
nary cellular functions and all. Meanwhile, the plasmids that were spliced into 
the host bacterium occur naturally, though not in Pseudomonas itself, and 
also did what they had always done: code for hydrocarbon degradation, spe-
cifically of camphor and octane. Taken together, however, these two prod-
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ucts of nature became one product that was ‘markedly different’ enough not 
to be considered natural. The mixture in Funk Brothers was a combination of 
bacterial strains, and the mixture in Chakrabarty was a combination of host 
bacterium and plasmids. The former was a product of nature, the latter was 
not, and the salient difference seems to have been that the latter resulted in a 
new organism. In other words, what the relevant unit of observation is can 
matter a lot. 
2.3 The Myriad case 
In light of these precedents, should isolated DNA sequences be considered 
products of nature? The district court’s decision regarding Myriad’s compo-
sition claims said yes (Myriad I 2010). Judge Sweet concluded that genes are 
carriers of biologically important information and that their legal status must 
therefore be evaluated in informational terms. In that evaluation, DNA se-
quences reflect the same information in their isolated form as they would in 
their wild-type form: the same set of nucleotides in the same order encoding 
the same amino acids. Thus, isolated DNA sequences are not only not ‘mark-
edly different’ – in the informational sense, they are not different at all. This 
logic would later echo in the Supreme Court’s decision as well. 
 The Federal Circuit’s decision, meanwhile, said no (Myriad II 2011). Un-
like the nucleotide chain of the wild-type BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene that oc-
curs in nature, the nucleotide chain of the isolated gene is chemically discon-
nected from its adjacent nucleotides. In nature, covalent bonds would attach 
to the 3’ and 5’ ends of the gene. For the isolated gene, they end in a hydrox-
yl group and a phosphate group, respectively. As the Federal Circuit ex-
plained, this makes the isolated gene a “free-standing” molecule with a “dis-
tinctive chemical identity from that possessed by native DNA” (ibid.). This 
may seem like a technicality, but the Federal Circuit underscored that “a 
covalent bond is the defining boundary between one molecule and another”. 
As for why this was different enough to be ‘markedly different’, the court 
further explained that “genes are in fact materials having a chemical nature 
and, as such, are best described in patents by their structures rather than their 
functions” (ibid.) notwithstanding that some may think of molecules, even 
macromolecules such as DNA, in terms of their functions and uses. 
 A fortiori, this discussion of why gDNA sequences like the isolated genes 
of Myriad’s patents were not products of nature reflected a similar discussion 
of why cDNA was not a product of nature, either. cDNA not only had un-
bonded 3’ and 5’ ends (just as gDNA did) but also contained only exons: the 
non-coding introns had been removed. As a result, cDNA did not even cor-
respond in terms of its nucleotide sequence to any naturally occurring nucleic 
acid. So if gDNA was not a product of nature, cDNA was certainly not a 
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product of nature. Both were patent-eligible because, in drawing a compari-
son between the patented invention and the corresponding product of nature, 
the relevant unit of observation was chemical structure. 
 However, the Supreme Court saw things differently. In comparing isolat-
ed gDNA sequences for BRCA1 and BRCA2 to the wild-type gDNA se-
quences of those genes, it was not chemical structure alone that was relevant. 
Instead, the information contained in the nucleotide sequence was the rele-
vant unit of observation. The reason for this, said the Supreme Court, was 
that the language of Myriad’s own patent claims was expressed not in terms 
of chemical composition but rather in terms of sequence information. More-
over, the invention over which the patent claims purported to assert owner-
ship did not rely on any chemical change that might have resulted from the 
cleaving of covalent bonds to produce an isolated section of gDNA. The 
claims focused on the genetic code reflected in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene 
sequences, and that would be the way in which their status as products of 
nature would be evaluated. 
 This approach prioritized genetic information over chemical structure. By 
this approach, claims to cDNA would still survive. Structural difference at 
the 3’ and 5’ end was the only basis for the patent-eligibility of gDNA, but 
cDNA differed in both structure and nucleotide sequence. Thus, the removal 
of introns to produce a new sequence meant that, even under the Supreme 
Court’s more stringent approach, cDNA remained markedly different from 
the underlying DNA out of which it was transcribed. Indeed, this was essen-
tially the result as well as the approach that the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral had counseled from the start. 
 The decision was highly anticipated and immediately controversial. PUB-
PAT, the ACLU, and a host of advocacy groups that were aligned with them 
had pushed for a broader conclusion that DNA sequences that correspond to 
naturally occurring genes, whether those sequences take the form of gDNA 
or cDNA, were patent-ineligible products of nature because their nucleotide 
sequences were determined by nature rather than by human design. The Su-
preme Court’s Myriad decision fell short of that goal by leaving cDNA eligi-
ble. Meanwhile, Myriad itself and biotechnology companies that held DNA-
related composition patents similar to Myriad’s suffered a setback from the 
patent-ineligibility of claims to isolated gDNA. Those rights were no longer 
valid, and a great many others could now use those gDNA sequences freely. 
 The government’s position, which prevailed, was widely seen as a com-
promise to ensure that the building blocks of genetic and genomic innovation 
were unencumbered and widely available, while the opportunity to recoup 
investments in developing libraries of cDNA sequences would remain viable 
for the biotechnology industry. Whether or not this pragmatic policy choice 
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was what actually motivated the Supreme Court’s decision, it was the result 
that the decision brought. 
2.4 Myriad overseas: Revisiting the European Biotechnology 
Directive 
The controversy was not limited to the United States. After the Supreme 
Court in Chakrabarty announced a broad purview of eligibility for patents in 
biotechnology, the European Commission in 1982 proposed its own legisla-
tive reform in order to make biotechnology-related inventions eligible for 
patents issued by the European Patent Office (EPO). These efforts culmi-
nated in the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 
–commonly known as the European Biotechnology Directive – and were 
aimed at keeping the European Union competitive with the United States as 
to incentives for innovation, such as in biotechnology, requiring long-term 
capital investment. The EPO implemented the European Biotechnology 
Directive as part of the European Patent Convention, the multilateral treaty 
that authorizes the EPO to consolidate the patent application process in 
member countries across Europe. 
 Over its decade-and-a-half-long deliberations, the Parliament of the Eu-
ropean Union had worked out a fairly specific position about whether and 
when patents can be issued over inventions related to DNA and other genetic 
materials. This was a different posture than that of the United States. The 
apparently broad mandate of Chakrabarty had come from a politically insu-
lated Supreme Court, and so its stability over time depended on different 
institutional forces than did the legislative consensus that undergirded the 
European Biotechnology Directive. 
 As a result, the dramatic reversal in the Supreme Court’s Myriad decision 
raised the possibility that the greater specificity and greater predictability and 
clarity of European patent laws on biotechnology made the EU more attrac-
tive for investment. For example, Article 5(1) of the European Biotechnolo-
gy Directive provides as follows: 
The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and 
the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions. 
By contrast, Article 5(2) and 5(3) provide as follow: 
An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of 
a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may 
constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is iden-
tical to that of a natural element. 
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The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be 
disclosed in the patent application. 
The circumstances in the United States were more nebulous, requiring pre-
dictions about what might or might not be considered a product of nature in 
the future. Guessing wrong meant that large sums of today’s investment 
could be lost tomorrow when others see a desirable but expensive patented 
technology and try to make it more widely accessible by removing its patent 
protections. These sorts of potential costs had to be weighed, of course, 
against benefits such as improved research access to natural products unfet-
tered by exclusive rights. The real uncertainty was whether, on balance, the 
cost-benefit calculus would enhance net social welfare. 
 Analytically, the approach of the European Biotechnology Directive was 
to avoid making patent eligibility dependent on vague constructs such as 
what counts as a ‘product of nature’ (or an ‘abstract idea’ or ‘natural phe-
nomenon’ – which are also ineligible under U.S. patent law). Instead, the 
Directive does much line-drawing between what is eligible and what is not. 
For example, human beings at various phases of development are not eligible 
for patenting. Other forms of life may be eligible, though they must not be 
caused to suffer unless there is substantial countervailing medical benefit. 
Discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical methods are not considered 
inventions at all and so are not eligible. And in general, inventions must be of 
a technical nature and have a technical effect or industrial application in order 
to be eligible under the European approach. In all, the clarity of the European 
Biotechnology Directive and of its implementing regulations does not neces-
sarily correspond to broader or more generous patent scope. In fact, much is 
excluded, but the boundary lines are easier to identify. 
 For Myriad, this meant that its corresponding European patents on 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 were adjudicated more straightforwardly on the basis of 
the relevant European patent law when those patents were challenged in the 
European Patent Office, rather than lurching from one judicial approach to 
another regarding the vague product of nature doctrine. Commentator Jessi-
ca Lai framed the point in the first major post-Myriad scholarly analysis of 
the BRCA patents in Europe this way: “neither BRCA1 nor BRCA2 were 
strongly patented in Europe,” but for firms in the biotechnology industry, it 
is hard to ignore that the European BRCA-related patents largely survived 
where the U.S. patents did not (Lai 2015). 
 The flip side of this dynamic is that although enactment of the European 
Biotechnology Directive reflected sufficient consensus in the European Par-
liament twenty years ago, popular unease with the patenting of human genes 
existed then and has only grown since the turn of the century. As Dr. Lai 
points out, important U.S. Supreme Court decisions can and do influence law 
and policy in other jurisdictions, especially given the preeminent role of the 
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United States in shaping the international patent harmonization agenda. The 
growing disfavor, even in parts of Europe, for DNA-related patents may find 
ample support in both the Myriad decision and the subsequent decisions of 
the lower U.S. federal courts interpreting Myriad. 
 Taken together, this body of recent American jurisprudence reflects a 
discernible trend against allowing such patents where, for example, their 
application is in diagnostic medicine (Eisenberg 2015). For biomedical pa-
tents more generally, however, this trend may be somewhat more attenuated 
in magnitude or at least mixed in its applicability (Rai 2013). In either case, 
the finite resilience of Chakrabarty and similar judicial precedents is a re-
minder that legislative milestones such as the European Biotechnology Di-
rective are not immune from reconsideration merely because of their longevi-
ty. 
3. Ethical Implications 
Until now, the discussion has traced the legal question of whether exclusive 
rights can be asserted over DNA sequences through patent law, and the bio-
chemistry and genetics that underlie that legal debate have been scientifically 
straightforward. In fact, what was really contested in this legal debate with 
regard to the science was what scientific facts were relevant, and who was 
best suited to decide what was relevant. The key choice of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Myriad was to consider DNA not merely as a large mole-
cule that has chemical structure and function but, more profoundly, as a ve-
hicle for important genetic information. This section now evaluates the an-
swer to that legal question in ethical terms. The themes of contested rele-
vance and the power to decide remain important here as well, and are devel-
oped further. 
3.1 Expertise and generalism 
At the start of this decade, law professor Peter Lee published an important 
and wide-ranging paper in the Yale Law Journal applying the ‘Two Cultures’ 
thesis first advanced by C.P. Snow in postwar Britain. Snow’s argument was 
that intellectual specialization in the liberal arts and the sciences, respectively, 
threatened a “gulf of mutual incomprehension” between these two broad 
segments of academic thought (Snow 1959). Professor Lee’s insight, in turn, 
was that the ‘Two Cultures’ are a helpful lens through which to understand 
and evaluate U.S. patent law. The major premise of Professor Lee’s paper is 
that “no matter how elegantly policymakers craft patent law, if generalist 
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judges lack the capacity to administer it, the patent system cannot fulfill its 
objectives” (Lee 2010). This foreshadows, of course, the epistemic debate 
that would arise in the Myriad case between the more expert but narrowly 
specialized postures of the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit, on the one 
hand, and the more authoritative but generalist postures of the Solicitor Gen-
eral and the Supreme Court, on the other. 
 Professor Lee’s thesis suggests a preference that generalism should enjoy 
primacy. The expert institution has its say, and the generalist institution lis-
tens carefully, but the generalist is who decides. So the expert had better be 
able to translate complex information persuasively. Indeed, this is how such 
decisions are actually made in practice. Generalist decision makers might 
choose at various times to give more or less deference to experts further 
down the chain of authority, but the need to translate complexity cannot be 
eliminated. The ethical dimension of this translational challenge lies in an 
interaction between specialists and generalists that remains to be considered: 
the dialogues between inventors and patent lawyers and among patent law-
yers themselves. 
 Patent lawyers who represent inventors before the Patent Office to secure 
patent rights over inventions grapple most directly with the ‘Two Cultures’ 
problem. As lawyers, they must complete traditional legal training, including 
reasoning by analogy, inducing general principles from specific cases, and 
synthesizing conflicting propositions. However, permission to practice be-
fore the Patent Office also requires education or experience in a science or 
engineering discipline. Thus, patent lawyers must also demonstrate proficien-
cy in the scientific method, including developing and testing hypotheses, 
reasoning quantitatively, and drawing or rejecting causal inferences in accord-
ance with statistical norms. 
 As Snow and Lee recognized, these two epistemic orientations are far 
from mutually exclusive, but they do prioritize different modes of thinking, 
knowing, and – what is especially important – making arguments. Notably, 
representing clients in the Patent Office is not the only kind of patent law-
yering. A great many lawyers negotiate business deals involving patent rights, 
file or defend patent-related lawsuits in the courts, and engage in a range of 
patent policy and other patent-related endeavors, all without having any 
training or epistemic orientation in science or engineering. These all may still 
reasonably be considered patent lawyers. 
 Ultimately, all patent lawyers must work in that system of social, political, 
and legal institutions where legal rights over complex scientific and techno-
logical innovation must be reconciled with the more broadly held values from 
which patent law draws its legitimacy in the first place. Because a patent legal-
ly empowers its owner to exclude others from making, selling (or even offer-
ing for sale), importing, or using the invention, the most commonly cited 
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broader value underlying patent law is innovation in the technological and 
economic sense. On this view, what matters is whether patents on gene se-
quences or other DNA-related innovations promote or hinder research and 
whether they promote or hinder the development of industries to bring that 
research to market (Contreras & Deshmukh 2017; Cook-Deegan et al. 2012). 
This is not the only narrative that bears on gene patenting, however. 
 Apart from the view of patents as incentives to innovation, additional and 
often competing views exist as well of broadly held social values that patent 
law should accommodate (Contreras 2016). One view is that science should 
be concerned more with fostering collaborative and path-breaking discovery 
than with pursuing individual profit for incremental advances. Another view 
is that legal institutions should avoid changing course suddenly or dramati-
cally because a stable institution that respects reliance interests can more 
effectively encourage those who undertake long-term research investments to 
view the institution’s commitments as credible. Still another view is that 
broader distributive effects, especially disparate limitations on access, should 
be taken into account when evaluating patent laws and patent rights because 
even a system that does everything it should to promote innovation may still 
be defective if, for example, it prices out vulnerable or otherwise marginalized 
segments of society from the innovation’s benefits. 
 Among these and other important narratives, some balance must be 
struck, and the recurring question of who decides comes again to the fore. 
However, beyond simply pointing to who decides in contemporary society, it 
is helpful to consider, in accordance with a well-developed system of philo-
sophical legal ethics, how to decide who decides. 
3.2 How to decide who decides 
In their recent and highly readable intellectual history of legal ethics, David 
Luban and Bradley Wendel describe that well-developed system as an ongo-
ing succession (Luban & Wendel 2017). The First Wave of legal ethics was 
rooted in moral philosophy and concerned primarily with the problem that a 
lawyer’s zealous, one-sided advocacy to the client might make the lawyer 
complicit in the client’s wrongs, inflict harms upon third parties, and rein-
force structures of social power that reward unethical or otherwise undesira-
ble actions. The Kantian view of people as ends in themselves, influential in 
Western thought, seemed to be at odds with the lawyer’s apparent duty to 
treat the client as the end and the lawyer as the means. In response, First 
Wave legal ethics scholars attacked the ‘neutral partisanship’ conception that 
a lawyers should remain agnostic to the morality of the client’s positions or 
demands, should dispassionately show partisanship toward the client’s inter-
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ests, and should be exempt from moral criticism for their role as mere inter-
mediaries (Simon 1978). 
 Thus, when a lawyer who majored in biochemistry during college, gradu-
ated from law school, and now works at a patent law firm receives a request 
from a client biotechnology company to file applications in the Patent Office 
on isolated gene fragments that the client has sequenced, an ethical choice 
confronts the lawyer. Should she draft the patent application and the claims 
to maximize her client’s potential future revenues through licensing and, if 
needed, litigation? Should she try to balance her client’s desire for revenue 
with the interests of academic research, e.g., by drafting claims that would 
cover industrial applications but not necessarily university research? Should 
she go even further and, either through claim drafting and the Patent Office 
process or by vigorous advice to the client, try to ensure that as broad a share 
of society as possible has access to the diagnostic or other benefits of the 
gene sequence? A First Wave legal ethicist would likely say that the answers 
to some of these questions are yes; that the primacy of the traditional lawyer-
client relationship must yield in difficult cases to more general ethical re-
quirements that apply to all individuals alike; and that the reason for this 
reconception is essentially moral in nature. 
 The Second Wave of legal ethics, by comparison, was rooted more in 
political philosophy. Rather than situating the lawyer in an individual moral 
stance, it was concerned primarily with the lawyer’s unavoidably institutional 
role. The lawyer is not just another person with universal ethical obligations 
but is “part of a scheme of political institutions and practices that has the 
governance of the community as its end” (Luban & Wendel 2017). This insti-
tutional role is especially important in pluralist societies where the whole 
assumption of homogenous moral norms is inapt. Such societies require what 
influential legal theorists Henry Hart and Albert Sacks called institutional 
settlement, a reconciliation of competing or conflicting normative judgments 
(Eskridge & Frickey 1993). For this reconciliation to have meaning, lawyers 
– indeed, all members of society – must respect the results of the settlement 
process even if those results are unpleasant in individual cases. Conversely, 
for the process of securing institutional settlement to have legitimacy, it must 
consider a broad enough range of normative perspectives that the result can 
reasonably be considered deliberative and just. 
 Thus, for our patent lawyer whose client seeks patents on isolated gene 
fragments, ethical choices remain. The Second Wave legal ethicist would 
point to the responsibility of the Patent Office and Solicitor General to take 
the concerns of impoverished patients into account when formulating policy. 
This consideration could not take place in a vacuum, nor does it have to. 
Government agencies with policy authority over access to healthcare, such as 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services within the Department of 
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Health and Human Services, might properly be included in an executive-
branch discussion with the Patent Office about the broader social effects of 
gene-related patents. So might the Food and Drug Administration, which 
regulates clinical testing of pharmaceuticals and whose lawyers and policy 
advisors are familiar with the interactions of patent law with drug safety and 
efficacy. 
 Importantly, the institutionally political (rather than individually moral) 
stance of Second Wave legal ethics does not let our patent lawyer off the 
hook. In addressing arguments to various audiences such as executive agen-
cies or federal courts, she remains obligated to educate herself and to educate 
and advise her client about various pluralist perspectives that are likely to 
bear on the client’s interests. This obligation was crystallized starkly during 
the Myriad case in how the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court worked 
to fulfill their respective responsibilities not only to determine which view of 
the product of nature doctrine would promote innovation or hinder universi-
ty research or distribute access to breast cancer diagnostics one way or the 
other, but also to determine which of these objectives were worth pursuing at 
the expense of which others. 
3.3 The dichotomy in Myriad 
Recognizing these obligations recalls our starting point: the Justice Depart-
ment and its magic microscope in April 2011. By this point, we can identify 
all the relevant actors as well as the epistemic orientations that underpin their 
respective arguments and decisions. Myriad Genetics, the innovator seeking 
to protect its patents and revenue streams, had solved a scientific problem 
and cast its solution in scientific terms. Myriad’s orientation was more tech-
nical in its nature and more narrowly specialized in its expertise. The Patent 
Office had taken a similarly technical and specialized posture in granting 
Myriad’s patents. This was true of the agency leadership who had previously 
deemed genetic sequences patentable and would later defend that decision in 
executive-branch deliberations. It was also true of the patent examiners who 
had evaluated Myriad’s actual applications under then-existing laws and 
found them to be deserving of patents. 
 By contrast, PUBPAT and the ACLU were recasting Myriad’s scientific 
solution in broader terms. In their view, the ability of molecular biologists to 
correlate genetic mutations with elevated risks of developing breast and ovar-
ian cancer was only the beginning. Unless and until that scientific contribu-
tion could be met with legal and regulatory policy that ensured widespread 
usage of the invention as well as economic and fiscal policy that ensured 
widespread access by patients across the socioeconomic spectrum, the justifi-
cations for conferring exclusive patent rights on life-saving diagnostic meth-
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ods were not satisfied. Thus, PUBPAT and the ACLU’s orientation was 
much more broadly generalist. 
 Judge Sweet in the Southern District of New York was similarly general-
ist, as federal district judges tend to be. The Federal Circuit is a high-profile 
exception to this rule given its more specialized patent-related responsibili-
ties, but the Supreme Court again restores the norm of favoring generalism. 
Executive branch orientation follows a similar upward trend toward general-
ism. Subordinate agencies are specialized according to their respective mis-
sions whereas high-level officials such as the Solicitor General are broadly 
generalist. In the middle are agency heads, who must translate between polit-
ical superiors and technical employees. 
 Thus, at each step in a dispute, one may expect different chances of suc-
cess depending on one’s own orientation and that of the audience. PUBPAT 
and the ACLU found a favorable generalist audience in the district court, but 
Myriad and the Patent Office found a favorable specialist audience at the 
Federal Circuit. The Solicitor General and the Supreme Court had no easy 
task in disentangling the perspectives that had percolated up toward them. 
The Solicitor General’s office had to come to grips with its lack of relevant 
scientific expertise relative to the Patent Office (and other agencies such as 
the NIH), just as the Patent Office had to come to grips with its lack of rele-
vant authority. A similar dynamic described the generalist but authoritative 
Supreme Court and the expert but subordinate Federal Circuit. 
 In this kind of complex and multi-faceted dispute, it is not enough for our 
hypothetical patent lawyer simply to say, ‘I have studied biochemistry and 
law, and because this isolated DNA sequence is a molecule, patent law’s fa-
miliar rules on chemical inventions govern’. That may turn out to be the 
conclusion, as it was in the Federal Circuit’s decision. However, our brief 
ethical analysis, the Solicitor General’s position, and the Supreme Court’s 
decision suggest that this insular view is not a proper starting point. As Myri-
ad’s lawyers as well as PUBPAT and the ACLU’s lawyers discovered as the 
dispute progressed, this insular view excludes competing perspectives that 
may lack scientific or doctrinal expertise but nevertheless have authority 
from broader social values that the patent system should accommodate. 
These considerations also underscore the importance of Professor Lee’s 
overall argument, that the patent system cannot fulfill its objectives unless 
the expertise of those inside the system can be translated effectively to the 
generalists who must administer it. 
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4. Conclusion 
This brief and selective glimpse into one of the more contentious and far-
reaching disputes over the ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic and 
genomic innovation has identified a few recurring themes that merit further 
study. One is the ongoing tension between experts and non-expert general-
ists in the often zero-sum sphere of political and social decision making. For 
reasons of institutional settlement and broader reasons of democratic legiti-
macy that are outside the scope of this discussion, generalists largely hold 
ultimate authority in the patent system. 
 However, the limits on expert input should not be taken as a sign that 
expertise is unimportant. If anything, the vesting of decisional power in gen-
eralists means that scientists, engineers, and others who have cultivated tech-
nological expertise bear a correspondingly greater responsibility to engage, 
educate, and persuade those outside their respective disciplines about what 
the facts are and how those facts matter. 
 Another recurring theme, related to the translational obligation of ex-
perts, is that the ethical stance of those with training in the natural sciences 
should extend beyond individual demands of moral philosophy, important 
though they are. It should further consider institutional demands of political 
philosophy as well. As with generalism, the salient lesson is one of engage-
ment. 
 Such engagement may take the form of seeking advanced training in in-
terdisciplinary problems. It may also take the form of being purposeful about 
the kinds of financial, social, professional, or other incentives to which to 
respond. Because the science of biochemistry, and the particularly compelling 
potential of genetics and genomics, are so intimately tied to basic questions 
of human health and self-determination, these calls to engagement apply with 
special force to those in the chemistry-related disciplines. 
Notes
 
1 The details of that patent policy matter are discussed in Section 2.2 below. 
2 In patent law, a ‘product of nature’ is not eligible for patenting, though a human-
made invention can be patent-eligible even if derived from a natural product – if 
the invention is ‘markedly different’ from what occurs in nature. 
3 A patent is a stylized document with distinct sections and parts. The ‘claims’ of a 
patent are the statements at the end that specify what the inventor actually invent-
ed. Taken together, the claims in a patent must all point to a single invention, but 
each claim represents a slightly different embodiment of that invention. 
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4 This language is most closely associated in patent law with the Chakrabarty deci-
sion but was actually part of the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act itself. 
Further Reading 
The following papers offer an overview of important issues that remain after 
the Supreme Court’s Myriad Genetics decision: Cook-Deegan 2012, Rai & 
Cook-Deegan 2013, Sherkow & Greely 2015. These issues include the grow-
ing usage of trade secrecy over clinical data, the legal outlook for whole-
genome sequencing, and historical lessons about how genes first came under 
the purview of the patent system. 
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